INTRODUCTION
Compared to a global trend towards governance transfer by regional organizations, the League of Arab States is clearly a latecomer in prescribing and promoting governance standards in its member states -and its efforts are more limited and weaker than in many other regional organizations (Börzel and Stapel in this volume). While the Arab League started to deal with selected human rights issues in the late 1960s, an Arab Charter on Humans Rights as the cornerstone of a regional human rights regime only entered into force in 2008 -much later than its American, European, and African counterparts. Continental organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU), had developed regional human rights regimes early on. Moreover, many regional organizations worldwide turned to more actively prescribing and promoting standards related to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance in the 1990s. By contrast, only in the 21 st century has the Arab League begun to step up its efforts at governance transfer. It focuses on human rights as compared to democracy, the rule of law, or good governance, but even the catalogue of human rights adopted in 2004 falls short of international standards and the Arab Human Rights Committee has only a limited mandate for its promotion and protection.
This empirical observation is not too surprising when one considers the 'persistence of authoritarianism' and the notoriously bad human rights performance of regimes in the region, backing the argument that a demand for governance transfer is often driven by an interest in 'locking in' democratic reforms in democratizing and newly democratic member states at the regional level (Börzel and van Hüllen in the Introduction to this volume). Accordingly, the evolution of governance transfer by regional organizations in Africa and more recently also in Asia is tightly linked to the democratization of individual member states (Börzel and van Hüllen in the Conclusion of this volume). In the Middle East and North Africa, however, member states of the Arab League have not yet experienced successful democratic transitions -Tunisia having been the last hopeful candidate in the wake of the 'Arab Spring' of 2011.
From the first creation of a Permanent Arab Commission for Human Rights (PACHR) in
1968 to the adoption of the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 2004 and its subsequent ratification, there has not been a significant change in the 'democratic quality' of its member states that could account for the Arab League's increasing efforts at governance transfer. So why do authoritarian regimes engage in governance transfer at the regional level at all -and how can we account for changes in the intensity of their efforts over time?
The existence of a 'global script' for human rights as universally recognized governance standards can actually create a rational -rather than normative -demand among authoritarian regimes for governance transfer by their regional organization. Conforming to international (and domestic) expectations by creating regional provisions for governance transfer helps to fend off external attempts at interference in domestic and regional affairs and, at the same time, to remain in control of their design and application. This instrumental demand for 'pseudo'-governance transfer results in particularly weak institutions designed to deflect external pressure instead of effectively promoting and protecting governance standards in member states.
The second section will start by sketching the evolution of the Arab League's efforts at governance transfer, covering its early engagement in human rights issues in the 1960s, the intensification of cooperation in selected human rights fields throughout the 1970s up until the 1990s, and the subsequent 'leap' in governance transfer in 2004. The third section then accounts for this evolution by tracing changes in the international and domestic environment since the 1960s. Various bodies of the United Nations (UN) and transnational human rights organizations actively promoted the evolving 'script' for human rights and their protection by regional organizations, pushing the Arab League to selectively engage in human rights issues.
The subsequent intensification of regional cooperation on women and children's rights was facilitated by international human rights norms gaining prescriptive status in more and more member states and processes of political liberalization. However, changing security perceptions in the international community in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 Changes in the international and domestic context generated a demand for governance transfer among authoritarian member states that had little to do with a genuine interest in protecting and promoting governance standards related to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. The (selective) institutionalization of (selected) standards and instruments, especially in the field of human rights, allowed the member states of the Arab League to signal both domestic constituencies and international community that they were part of a 'modern' regional organization in line with a global script in order to (re)gain legitimacy and stabilize their rule.
The Beginning in the 1960s
The organizations with an authoritarian membership will be a 'success' or a 'failure' for the promotion of governance standards worldwide, will ultimately depend on its impact as leading to 'better' or 'worse' governance.
Beyond changes in the international environment, the 'Arab Spring' in early 2011 also promised to change the domestic conditions for governance transfer by the Arab League. A wave of popular protest challenged authoritarian rulers throughout the region and initiated a new dynamic, with regard to both domestic political reforms and to regional cooperation.
Initially, hopes were high for democratic transitions in a number of countries that would radically alter the political landscape in the region and the composition of the Arab League's membership, possibly giving a boost to governance transfer by the Arab League in order to effectively lock in democratic reforms. They were, however, soon dashed as most regimes managed to stay in power, adopting only marginal political reforms, and transition processes in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen went awry, leaving only Tunisia as a candidate for democratic regime change. However, Arab governments still paid increased attention to human rights and governance issues at the regional level in light of the Arab Spring: by November 2011, the proposal for an Arab Court of Human Rights, first tabled in the early 1970s, was put forward by the King of Bahrain and in 2014, the Arab heads of state and government adopted a draft statute at their Summit in Kuwait. Even the Gulf-Cooperation Council (GCC), bringing together six of the least politically liberalized countries in the Arab world, started to discuss human rights issues at the regional level. The form and content of these initiatives, however, suggests a continued demand for symbolic measures to alleviate domestic and international pressure rather than measures that effectively support political reforms for the liberalization and modernization, if not democratization, of incumbent regimes in line with a global governance script. In line with the Arab League's previous initiatives for governance transfer, the proposal for a human rights court 'falls well short of regional and international human rights standards ' (FIDH and ICI 2014) and the GCC's human rights office, established in 2012, is primarily mandated to document human rights policies and 'achievements' in the GCC and its member states (GCC 2012) . It remains to be seen in how far political reforms below the threshold of democratic regime change will be sufficient to allow the 'spiral model' to work (more) successfully in the future (van Hüllen 2013) and generate a greater demand for governance transfer by the Arab League.
